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In recent years, disillusionment with the effectiveness of traditional means of regulation has led to experimentation with a variety of new techniques. Among these traditional means are regulatory tools based on the use of incentives rather than command-and-control (on incentives vs. directives, see, e.g., Mitnick 1980a; on standards and their advantages, see Fischhoff 1984) . Supported by an analytic literature that suggests the improved efficacy of incentives, these techniques have begun to 'In this study, efficiency is defined in traditional economic terms as the residual output after accounting for all factors of production.
a number of studies of the incentive-like effects of regulatory programs. We will not review that literature here; a few examples should suffice. The so-called "A-J-W effect" (for the economists Averch, Johnson, and Wellisz), which posits that rate-of-return regulation should promote overinvestment in a utility's capital base, has been studied extensively and with mixed results. In a study of the electric utility industry, Jarrell (1979) found that utilities inflated reported asset values as a response to rate of return regulation. In another study, Abdel-Khalik (1988) found that electric utility size is the most important determinant of executives' compensation and that higher compensation for CEOs in this industry is partially associated with accruing relatively larger operating slack and capital utilization efficiency, reflecting expense preference for overcapitalization. More recently, for the healthcare industry, Soderstrom (1993) found that hospitals in poor financial health respond to Medicare incentives by increasing admissions and misreporting patient diagnosis. Quite a large number of such studies of regulatory effects demonstrate distortions or unintended byproducts of regulatory controls. Thus, findings like ours that incentive programs do not perform as intended are quite consistent with many results obtained in the literature on regulatory impacts.
receive widespread application even in industries like nuclear power generation, in which extremely high reliability in operation is critical for safety (see Marcus 1988; Marcus, Nichols, and Bromiley 1989; Roberts 1993; La Porte and Consolini 1991; Marcus, Nichols, and McAvoy 1993; La Porte and Thomas 1995; Greenstein, McMaster, and Spiller 1995) . The success of such means is uncertain, however.
In this article, we sketch some of the features that characterize successful incentive systems. Using data on performance and safety in the nuclear power industry, we examine whether the incentives used by public utility commissions are effective. Our analysis suggests that these means are not as effective as had been supposed. Contrary to expectation, plants with incentive programs do not appear to have improved efficiency.
1 Incentive programs also may affect safety adversely in some circumstances, though the results regarding safety are inconsistent. The evidence is consistent with speculation that the efficiency improvements that do exist could have been obtained by pushing reactor units, thereby causing more automatic reactor shutdowns or scrams.
THE INCENTIVE SYSTEMS LITERATURE
Ever since policy analysts and scholars of administrative design have begun to rethink the means by which regulation is conducted, they have sought to identify the most appropriate tools of control. This work has ranged from the identification of new regulatory tools, such as the use of incentives rather than directives, to the study of impediments to the implementation of such means. It has also included exploration of alternative ways to achieve goals through such devices as permit markets (cf. Kneese and Schultze 1975; Dubnick 1979; Mitnick 1980a and b; Hogwood and Peters 1983; Hood 1983; Mitnick and Backoff 1984; Salamon 1989; Weimer and Vining 1992) . 2 The study of incentives and incentive systems has spanned a number of literatures. It continues to draw scholarly attention in such fields or research areas as the study of bureaucracy and interest groups; exchange theory and network approaches; formal theories of contracting and of regulation; and managerial and organizational incentive systems, including agency approaches to control, corporate governance issues, and executive compensation.
• Incentives in bureaucracy and interest groups. There is a long tradition of attention to incentives in bureacracy and interest groups in the political science and public administration
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literatures. Recent scholarship usually does not rely explicitly on this older incentives literature, though the earlier work was influential.
3 There is also a substantial, if older, empirical literature on such incentives-related topics as the bases for participation in political organizations (e.g., Hofstetter 1971 and . But some critics have found that the logic used in many of the older works in order to analyze incentive systems is incomplete and inconsistent (e.g., Rainey 1977 and . For example, important incentives are not included in many of the studies, and the categories of incentives seem arbitrarily constructed. Furthermore, it is not apparent how studies of incentives for joining and remaining members of organizations (March and Simon 1958) translate into understanding of generalized incentive theory or inform the design of incentive-based methods used to control behavior in general. Indeed, we remain surprisingly ignorant of what features of incentive systems make them effective.
• Exchange and network approaches. The sociological literature on exchange theory (i.e., that associated with such scholars as Homans, Blau, Coleman, Emerson, and Cook) features implicit discussions of incentive systems. Recent work that is largely but not entirely by sociologists doing network analysis considers these scholars explicitly (e.g., Marsden and Lin 1982; Knoke and Wright-Isak 1982; Knoke 1990 ; see also Shapiro 1987) . Like that in the political participation literature, Knoke's important work has focused mostly on the membership activities of associations or interest groups rather than on control in complex regulatory settings (but see Zald 1978) . Relatively few works in sociology aim at developing explicit, systematic incentive system theories, although Knoke's efforts are a significant exception.
• Formal theories of contracting and of regulation. Developments in formal theories of incentive contracts and regulation, much of it growing out of agency theory (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1993) , parallel the proposals to use incentives in regulation. Researchers have learned a great deal about the abstract features of incentive system contracts that encourage agents to provide truthful reports and act in the principal's interest (see Sappington 1991; Milgrom and Roberts 1992) . However, they 'See. e.g Barnard (1938) ; Simon (1945) ; j^v e i earned i ess about me pract i ca l design of SUCh Systems in March and Simon (1958) Wilson (1961) ; Downs (1967) ; Salisbury ^ P ubhc domain (but see several recent works, cited in this (1969); Wilson (1973) ; Rainey (1977 and article, including Sappington and Weisman 1996) . In general, 1996) ; and Moe (1980) . For the newer applications of formal theory in policy or industry contexts have agency-based incentives approaches to not been well connected t0 institutions or empirical study (but see bureaucracy, see, e.g., Moe (1984) ; _ . T , , , ,""" -, . . . , Rose-Ackerman (1986) ; Thompson and Strasser and Kohler 1989 for a work on incentives and regulatory Jones (1986) ; Eisenhardt (1989) ; and theory that does discuss social science literature outside the Mimick (1991) . economics incentive mechanism tradition). Abstract modeling of 4 Many recent applications are to compensation systems, especially executive compensation (see, e.g., Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1987; Nalbantian 1987; Eisenhardt 1988; Gomez-Mejia 1989 and Conlon and Parks 1995; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Fisher and Govindarajan 1992 and 1993; Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt 1993; Garen 1994; Parks and Conlon 1994; Welbourne, Balkin, and Gomez-Mejia 1995; Werner and Tosi 1995; Zajac and Westphal 1994 and 1995; Roth and O'Donnell 1996; Stroh, Brett, Baumann, and Reilly 1996; Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 1998) . It has been known for some time that the design of incentive pay systems involves many complex tradeoffs and the possibility of producing counterproductive behaviors (see, e.g., Balkin and Gomez-Mejia 1987;  the literature on incentive pay is voluminous; cf. Kerr 1975; Boettger and Greer 1994) . Although a number of empirical studies show the effectiveness of incentive compensation in areas as diverse as golf tournaments and industrial pay systems, it is clear that the effects, and the contingencies associated with those effects, vary enormously (see, e.g., the studies in Ehrenberg 1990 ; see also Werner and Tosi 1995; Banker et al. 1996) . Based on this experience, there is no reason to suppose that incentive designs in regulation should be any less complex. Yet, incentive regulatory programs that apply to nuclear power generation tend to feature relatively simple incentive designs.
a system as an incentive contract with various constraints is not the same as understanding how regulatory policy actually is formulated; how rules or other regulatory instruments are designed, adopted, implemented, and administered; and how these regulatory instruments are perceived, interpreted, and responded to by people in the many units within a firm.
The recent work on regulation has focused on a variety of incentive-producing mechanisms, such as price caps, and there is a growing literature based in applied economics that relates these mechanisms to firm-level effects such as technical efficiency or cost control (Blackmon 1994; Sappington and Weisman 1996) . There is now a growing corpus of empirical work, mostly in telecommunications (e.g., Crew 1994; Sappington and Weisman 1996; Majumdar 1997) and in electric utility regulation (e.g., Joskow and Schmalensee 1986; Crew 1994; Stoft and Gilbert 1994; Nwaeze 1997; Nwaeze and Mereba 1997) . This literature has not yet generated clear conclusions; it is littered with mixed results and some of the results have competing explanations. There does seem to be support for the simple generalization that incentive mechanisms can in at least some cases change firm behaviors (sometimes promoting efficiency) and perhaps affect regulatory compliance. Even if we suspect that incentive-producing controls do indeed have some effects, however, we are far from understanding the actual social and organizational mechanisms by which these effects are produced or the specific characteristics that incentive systems themselves must feature in order to work well.
• Managerial and organizational incentive systems. The management and organizations literature also has considered incentives. 4 Recent empirical work, experimentally based and using or testing agency theory rationales (e.g., Conlon and Parks 1990; Parks and Conlon 1995) , provides evidence for the efficacy of some incentive contract designs, but not for others. It suggests the need to include institutional factors. Even when results are clear, however, experimental knowledge cannot necessarily be transferred directly to real settings. We need to understand how agents and systems of agents embedded in complex organizational and societal settings respond in practice. Agency theory, after all, is interesting because agency problems are subject to imperfect if sometimes remarkably ingenious resolutions by people and systems in real institutional settings. We cannot assume that rational individuals will heroically find ways around all impediments to properly respond to an incentive contract that has been designed in advance (cf. Milgrom and Roberts 1992, 303) .
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Making Incentive Systems Work
The now-extensive empirical literature on agency and executive compensation recognizes complexities only sporadically. Often the major concerns are comparisons of incentive contracts or of alternative, relatively simple models (e.g., comparisons of tournament, power, and agency models; see Lambert, Larcker, and Weigelt 1993) . Although much can be gleaned from such approaches, as well as from the insights of the formal literature on incentive contracting (e.g., Hart and Holmstrom 1987; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Laffont and Tirole 1993) , critical linkages to actual institutions ultimately are needed. Even some of the formal theorists evidence some concern for this (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1993, 667-69) .
Moreover, much of the organizational literature on executive compensation and on such phenomena as corporate takeovers has not found consistent support for hypotheses derived from the agency theory of the firm. Some scholars in the economic agency tradition have ascribed the problems in finding support to "political forces" that are not considered in the analyses (Jensen and Murphy 1990, 262 ), but they do not provide theoretical approaches to amend the economic model. Others who have experienced similar problems using this agency model in the organization and management literature have suggested integrating it with other perspectives, usually institutional (e.g., Walsh and Seward 1990; Davis and Stout 1992; Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994; Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1994; Zajac and Westphal 1995) . Welboume, Balkin, and Gomez-Mejia (1995) link the agency model to the organizational justice literature. Work on agency, incentives, and behavior in contrast to outcome-based control systems has begun to consider the effects of institutional and contextual factors (Eisenhardt 1988; Banker et al. 1996) . This article addresses limitations of prior work in two ways. First, we provide a reasonably systematic statement of the requisites for successful dyadic incentive relations: relations between two parties-an incentive sender and an incentive receiver. This statement includes institutional influences and employs literature bases beyond economics. The focus is on incentive tools for regulation, while the relational system is governed by more than an incentive contract. By implication, the discussion also suggests the ways that such incentive systems fail. Second, we use a unique set of data to address the public utility design problem: Do incentive programs currently in place in the nuclear industry increase efficiency? Do they affect safety? Although the data and our analyses have some limitations, they produce surprising and suggestive results.
399/J-PART, July 1999
The institutional agency approach (Mitnick 1973 and is about as old as the economic theory of agency (Ross 1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976) and is less subject to the important concerns raised by critics such as Perrow (1986) and Dilulio (1994) . For example, in institutional agency there is no necessary presumption that the agents are solely self-interested. Moreover, institutional, including cognitive, factors are routinely included. Much of the economic theory of agency following from the important Jensen and Meckling (1976) piece proceeds as if agency theory and the theory of the firm were virtually synonymous and therefore carry the restricted assumptions about life in the economic-agencyfirm to all social relations that can be modeled as agency. In fact, even the original work on economic agency by Stephen Ross clearly envisions a more general and powerful theory of acting-for, not just a way to model the firm. Thus our use of the theory of agency does not have the baggage of assumptions and contexts often found in the economics and finance literature after Jensen and Meckling.
FACTORS THAT AFFECT INCENTIVE SYSTEM SUCCESS
To identify some of the important factors in the functioning of incentive relations, we distinguish the behavior of senders, receivers, and sender-receiver relationships (compare similar distinctions made in the organizational communication literature, such as Jablin et al. 1987) . Incentives are essentially relational in character (Mitnick and Backoff 1984) . Just as agency relationships establish and structure a relationship between agent(s) and principal(s), so do incentives. An incentive relationship typically establishes a relationship in which one actor, the agent, acts on behalf of or in service to the interests or preferences of the other, the principal.
By viewing incentives and agency as relations we emphasize their institutional features. Work in the economic tradition on agency has focused on decision mechanisms, on the characteristics of rational choice within the decision mechanism, and on the binding or choice-limiting features of contracts between the actors (see Jensen 1983 , which itself substitutes only a more involved decision structure). We include as well some of the embedding features of the institutional setting, with all levels, from individual to systemic, potentially contributing to performance outcome. The cost of a more encompassing and descriptively rich approach includes an inability to give models formal closure, but the result is no more problematic than in common theories in many social science areas. Our work thus rests on institutional agency theory, not on the more familiar economic theory of agency.
5 Agency is not a structured decision or a series of decisions; it is a social relationship embedded in organizational and societal settings. What happens is not adequately captured by such factors as who holds the rights to make certain decisions or how decision makers properly or improperly assign risk to actions, however important those features are.
Agency has been an attractive approach to a wide class of social behavior because its core logic seems to represent reality well; people rarely obtain perfect agents because it does not benefit them to do so. We need to include those real-world impediments-cognitive, organizational, and environmental-not abstract them into an incomplete decision calculus. In a simple incentive relation, the incentive sender sends an incentive message to the incentive receiver that specifies a reward contingent on the receiver performing some action. Notice that messages and rewards are transferred; the incentive itself is a relation, not a thing the agent receives. Even at this simple level, plenty of things might go awry: The message may be imprecise; 400/J-PART, July 1999 aimed at the wrong target; misperceived by the receiver; not received by the appropriate receiver; sent at the wrong time; and so on (compare the literature on message flow; see, for example, O'Reilly and Chatman 1987) . The reward may not be valued by the receiver or valued insufficiently or there may be competing rewards that submerge the incentive effect. The reward may be supplied at an insufficient level or it may never reach the receiver, so that no long-term relation featuring repeat performances is established. The contingent performances may be incorrectly chosen to achieve the sender's goal or the receiver may lack the capability to perform as requested.
Consider now some logical inferences from such problems in the sender, the sender-receiver relation, and the receiver. Our discussion will treat the sender and receiver together because they face some parallel cognitive and capability problems. We start with a brief discussion of the sender and receiver and their relationship and then provide our normative theory of successful incentive systems.
Sender and Receiver
The public policy implementation literature (see Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983) suggests that goals must be specific and clearly expressed; programs that focus on activities may produce those activities but not the outcomes desired. In a review of more than one hundred studies in the psychology literature, Locke et al. (1981, 131) conclude that the consistent finding is that "specific hard goals [induce] better performance than do-yourbest or no goals" (p. 145); review of additional studies only ratifies that conclusion (Locke and Latham 1990, 28-29) . In the accounting literature, most textbooks and articles about budget targets also suggest that for maximum motivation, targets should be "tight but achievable" (see Dunbar 1971; Horngren and Foster 1987; Horngren and Sundem 1987; Otley 1987; Merchant and Manzoni 1989) .
Even when problems with evaluative monitoring capability and the existence of a long-term relation suggest a focus on "behavior control" over "outcome control" (e.g., Eisenhardt 1985) , specific performance objectives are essential to ensure that displacement effects do not occur. That is, even when we cannot reward or control or even measure outcomes directly, we still must establish clear goals for the relationship. This may involve establishing surrogate goals or rules of thumb (e.g., Cyert and March 1963) believed to be associated with the desired outcomes.
Goals should be simple to facilitate the receiver's understanding of the objectives, the receiver's design of appropriate compliance activities, and the sender's ability to monitor compliance. Pitfalls can come from cognitive biases and errors as well as from noncalculative institutional factors (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Fiske and Taylor 1991) . Complex objectives carry with them the possibility of unintended goal interactions such that unanticipated consequences result (compare Thomas Schelling's well-known work). Thus, however laudable may be the establishment of complex, detailed objectives that fully sketch all desired outcomes, practical limits on direction and compliance exist. The sender must understand the reward mechanism, must have the capacity to supply adequate rewards (cf. the resource-based theory of the firm), and must be able to send appropriate messages to the receiver regarding the tasks required and the reward contingencies that attach to them. The receiver must receive and understand the message and have the skills and resources to design and perform the required tasks.
The Sender-Receiver Relationship
When rewards are valued and credibly scheduled, we have a condition that we term incentive congruence (compare incentive compatibility in the formal agency literature). In essence, the rewards must match the receiver and the incentivization task. The rewards may or may not appeal to self-interest; they may reflect community norms that are genuinely preferred by the receiver. Receivers may share or pursue the goals of the sender, as in a pure fiduciary (Mitnick 1975; Stinchcombe 1986 ; on cooperation and compliance, see Scholz 1991) . The reward schedule must distinguish between higher and lower levels of task performance and the rewards must match the agent's preferences. Messages from the incentive sender must be simple and credible, must be sent directly to the receiver, must make the proper contingent ties between action and reward, and must identify appropriate targets for action.
Traditional regulation routinely violated these recommendations: Design standards were complex and not adapted to appropriate local targets. They sometimes bore only tangential relation to the nominal outcomes of regulation (e.g., workplace safety or environmental cleanup). One of the early and compelling insights about the failure of federal government programs was concerned with the number of levels across which the programs flowed in implementation and with the dispersion of support funds and program-related specified activities across units and levels (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973) . Kerr (1975) observes how misdirected targeting can produce undesired outcomes; the phenomenon of displacement of effort is well described in social science (see also Boettger and Greer 1994; Merchant 1989) . The availability of reliable, informative monitoring methods can influence the choice of means of control (Eisenhardt 1988) . Traditional means often were chosen without adequate consideration of alternatives (cf. mimetic processes in the institutional theory literature; see Powell and DiMaggio 1991) .
Many such problems of regulatory control and compliance follow directly from the inherent character of principal-agent relationships: If the relation is established because of the need for an agent who is more expert or has greater information about tasks or contexts, then any directive from the (inexpert) principal regarding desired tasks that impinges on the agent's discretion risks producing suboptimal outcomes. At the same time, if the agent does not fully share the principal's goals regarding the principal's desired outcomes from the relation, or does not know how to relate tasks to such outcomes, then the principal who permits the agent full discretion to select tasks also risks suboptimal outcomes-agents may engage in self-seeking or wasteful behavior. Complaints about regulators who do not understand an industry, its technology, and its idiosyncratic plant or site characteristics seem to mirror such agency problems (for example, controversy about strip mining regulation before performance standards were introduced in the early 1980s or about OSHA regulation in the early days of the agency in the 1970s). As well, regulators who explain the need for intervention based on the past behavior of firms, behavior that produced such proscribed outcomes as pollution or unsafe or inequitable workplaces, reflect a belief that industry will not willingly avoid those impacts. Thus the implicit judgment is made that it is better for inexpert principal-regulators to constrain self-seeking but expert agent-firms and accept the resulting suboptimal outcomes. That is, regulators may achieve some or all of the outcomes they seek, but at a cost higher than is necessary. Furthermore, if regulatory directives are badly misinformed, the desired outcomes may not occur. One advantage of regulations that employ incentives, especially those that use performance rather than design standards, is that they try both to align goals and to allow increased discretion to the expert agent-firms to select the means of achieving and adapting the regulated outcomes.
The dyad of incentive sender and incentive receiver is rarely isolated, of course. Besides competing incentive relations, there are a host of social, cultural, and systemic factors. For example, some sources of influence are factors like "cultural distance" (Roth and O'Donnell 1996) and other characteristics of national culture; professional norms (Armstrong 1991; La Porte and Thomas 1995) ; industry tradition (Eisenhardt 1988) ; valued symbolic or ideological objects (e.g., Knoke and Wright-Isak 1982; Knoke 1990) ; and the particular characteristics of the firm or industry (see, e.g., Fisher and Govindarajan 1992 amd 1993; Banker et al. 1996) . Of course, systematic treatment of these factors would be necessary in a fully explicated analysis of incentive system functioning.
Avoidance of all the pitfalls inherent in incentive system design would represent a heroic achievement. In practice, incentive systems cannot and do not work perfectly. Indeed, the central insight of agency theory is that perfect agency neither occurs nor is worth pursuing. Still, incentive systems can and do work reasonably well in some settings. The challenge is to isolate in incentive systems the factors that produce better results. This understanding should be anchored in a normative theory of incentive system success: What features of incentive system design yield improvements in behavior and outcomes more consistent with the principal's wishes? Consistent with the perspective of agency theory, a more complete analysis would then examine how systems might still succeed in generating acceptable outcomes even where one or more components experience significant dysfunctions (cf. Oviatt 1988) . Though our analysis stops short of such a complete contingency theory of incentive system design, we believe that identification of many of the elements of optimal design can take us far toward the production of practical, successful incentive systems in regulation and elsewhere.
A NORMATIVE THEORY OF INCENTIVE SYSTEM SUCCESS
Based on the literature we discussed earlier and on our analysis of the nature of incentive relations, we present some core propositions of a normative theory of incentive system success. Our propositions are grouped into the following logical components of a dyadic incentive relation: incentive sender characters; sender-receiver relation characters, including reward composition, reward scheduling, and incentive transmission (messaging, channeling, and targeting); incentive receiver characters; and incentive system embeddedness.
Incentive Sender Characters
Incentive systems are more likely to be effective when the outcomes desired by the sender are simple, well defined, and understood by both the sender and (see below) the receiver; when the sender correctly understands the link between rewards, receiver performances, and outcomes for both the sender and the receiver; when the sender has the capacity to supply the rewards specified; and when the sender has the capacity to provide adequate incentive messages at the appropriate times and with the appropriate sequencing.
Sender-Receiver Relation Characters
Reward composition: Rewards must be recognizable to the receiver, valued by the receiver, and sent in sufficient supply to produce the outcomes desired.
Reward scheduling: Rewards must be tied to the performance of tasks and contingently delivered to the agent so that their delivery and purpose is credible to and understood by the agent, and so that an incentive effect is produced if the agent complies. That is, the reward and the task are so linked that the agent will be induced to perform the task in order to receive the reward.
Incentive transmission:
Incentive messaging: Incentive messages must be specific about the performances desired and the contingencies of reward provision. The messages must be made available to the appropriate receivers (those who manage performances and value the contingent rewards) in a timely manner. The messages must be understandable to the receivers.
Incentive channeling:
The more direct the transmission of incentive messages and rewards, the more effective they tend to be. Incentive systems should be constructed to minimize channel length and dispersion.
Incentive targeting: Incentive messages should identify behavior or performance of a kind and of a level that will produce the outcomes desired by the sender, that are within the discretion of receivers to produce, that are within the capabilities and hence feasible for the receiver to produce, and that are capable of measurement or observation by the sender or his/her agents so as to determine that the outcomes have in fact been achieved.
Incentive Receiver Characters
Incentive receivers must be able to perceive the incentive message correctly, understand the reward contingency and value the specified reward, have the capacity to design appropriate compliance activities to achieve the objectives expressed by the
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Making Incentive Systems Work principal, have the capacity to perform the contingent tasks, and have the discretion to perform the tasks.
Incentive System Embeddedness
Incentive systems tend to be limited in all their characteristics by those features that are characteristic of the society in which they function. Thus socially identified and supported norms and cultural artifacts may limit rewards and available reward contingencies. Moreover, regulatory tools tend to reflect the accepted (i.e., legitimate) inventory of such socially supported features. The tools themselves that are chosen for use tend to be those already in use, no matter how effective those tools are compared with other possible tools. But because the tools and their socially supported features are accepted in the societal setting, such regulatory tools tend to be more successful than those that are not of this type. New tools that look like old tools tend to work better than those that do not.
A particular problem arises when the simple dyadic condition is relaxed and multiple stakeholders are present. Opposing commands and instructions from such multiple stakeholders in a pluralistic society create for agents conflicts that can lead to unanticipated and unintended outcomes. It is difficult enough to work out the institutional characteristics of a dyadic relation; it is even more difficult to design an incentive system that satisfies the diverse needs of all the stakeholders. Studying the effects of incentive programs in different contexts, however, may help to identify the specific design features that are appropriate for each situation. We now move to our study of the nuclear power industry.
BACKGROUND OF THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY
Traditionally, the nuclear power industry has relied on direct regulation to ensure the effectiveness of its operations. Recently, as a bid toward greater deregulation, some regulation has been replaced by performance-based incentive programs. If this regulatory experiment is successful, many observers expect that it will promote the current trends in the industry toward greater deregulation and more market-driven competitive behavior.
Incentive problems arise in the electric utility industry partly as a consequence of the institutional and legal arrangements of the cost-plus pricing regime under which state public utility commissions (PUCS) operate. The cost-plus pricing system gives the utilities a mechanism by which they can shift all or part of the 406/J-PART, July 1999
Making Incentive Systems Work cost of "moral hazard" to consumers. In other words, the inability of the regulator to observe whether the utility is operating efficiently allows the utility to inflate its true costs, and the costplus regime allows these inflated costs to be passed on to consumers. In this situation, there are two competing sets of incentives: either it is in the interests of shareholders to provide managers with incentives to shift costs to consumers, or it is in the interests of consumers to persuade regulators to challenge the utilities' cost assumptions (see Abdel-Khalik 1988 ; see Goldberg 1976 on the regulator's role in balancing the rights of producers and consumers in utility regulation). Consumers, however, also are interested in ensuring that utility operations are safe. To this end, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a federal agency, regulates the industry using a control system that consists of inspections, fines, and, ultimately, threats to shut down operations. The nuclear power industry, then, has diverse stakeholders, each broadly interested in safe and efficient operation but with different priorities. The NRC is mainly interested in safety, and the PUCs are primarily interested in an equitable division of profits between utility shareholders and consumers. In particular, the PUCs must ensure that the energy produced is affordable and that the costs of utility inefficiency are not passed on to the consumers. While the NRC relies almost exclusively on standards-based, directive regulation, the PUCs have begun to use some incentive programs in addition to directives.
Regulation by the PUCs
Electric utilities in the United States are considered to be natural monopolies: They have decreasing marginal costs to the point where rapidly increasing efficiency can lead to monopolistic combination. The traditional rationale is that such industries must be subject to regulation that attempts to simulate competitive results and avoid consumer exploitation. Generally, the utilities are vertically integrated and engaged in generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity. The task of regulating their prices is assigned to state PUCs.
PUC guidelines for setting rates are fairly vague. The aim is to set just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates and to exclude any costs that have not been prudently incurred. Prices should reflect the cost of service. Regulatory mechanisms, therefore, are designed to help reveal a firm's true costs. Unfortunately, due to asymmetry of information between the firm and its regulators, true costs are difficult to ascertain. Under these conditions, management lacks incentives to minimize costs.
Rather than invest time and resources to become more efficient, management can try to convince regulators that its costs are too high and, therefore, that rates need to be increased (see the literature on managerial discretion, e.g., Williamson 1964 , as well as the more recent literature on agency costs). Rate-of-return regulation itself is said to produce distortions, as managers overinvest in order to boost allowed total returns (as long as the cost of borrowing makes such investment rational; this is the A-J-W effect). However such extra resources are extracted, managers may divert some to personal ends, reducing efficiency.
Performance-based incentive programs have been proposed and, recently, implemented as a potential solution to this problem. Such programs are supposed to motivate utilities to operate more efficiently. Although the theory predicts effects because of managers' self-interested objectives, the incentive programs built into the newer regulation produce incentives for the firm, not necessarily for individual managers. Hence, our concern is with the quality of the processes by which organizational incentives are converted to individual incentives. Our theory states that indirect transmission of rewards is less effective than direct transmission; channeling is important. Indeed, channel length and dispersion distort the process by which an agent is induced to perform a task.
Performance-Based Incentive Programs
The incentive programs used by PUCs financially reward or penalize performance. The programs are considered to be based on objective criteria and are intended to avoid the complexity inherent in case by case proceedings. As of December 1990, the end of the period covered by our empirical study, incentive programs were applicable to sixty nuclear units in sixteen states, affecting twenty-seven utilities.
As we suggested earlier, a key aspect of performance-based incentive programs is the direct correlation between the level of performance and the size of the reward or penalty. The nuclear power incentive programs try to use objective, predetermined formulas based on the performance of the nuclear power plant to determine the size of any financial reward or penalty, but they differ in many respects. For example, they can apply solely to a utility's nuclear unit, or include all system generating assets. They can apply only one measure of performance, or employ several measures at the same time.
In this study we measure performance using a measure of the efficiency with which a plant is operated. This measure of 408/J-PART, July 1999 'Actually the motivational band would start just left of point a.
The use of dead bands in incentive contracts is not well documented in research. While Merchant (1989) documents that one out of the twelve corporations in his sample has a dead band, he does not discuss the implications of this. Almost SO percent of the incentive programs in our sample have at least one dead-band zone.
efficiency is called the capacity factor. Capacity factor is defined as the ratio of the energy actually generated by a nuclear power plant to the total amount of energy that the plant would have generated had it operated at its design power rating continuously throughout the year. In other words, capacity factor is a measure of the degree to which a plant is operated at its optimal potential level of output. Capacity factor is one of the more common performance criteria used in regulatory incentive programs (i.e., the incentives themselves are designed to boost the capacity factor and this factor is measured to assess the performance of the utility in this regard).
In addition to the varied performance measures used in the incentive programs, the pattern of incentive benefits that the utility is awarded for differing levels of performance success also varies from program to program. These often take the forms of allowed adjustments in the utility's revenues. Although, in general, incentive programs reward good performance and penalize poor performance, some programs include a zone of performance-a dead band-in which neither rewards nor penalties accrue (see Appendix A for two examples of the different kinds of incentive contracts; see Appendix C for a depiction of a dead band as well as data on three incentive programs that feature dead bands).
During the study period there were eleven nuclear incentive programs; nine of the programs incorporated rewards and penalties and two applied banked reward mechanisms and penalties. Seven of the nine programs incorporated dead bands ranging from 12.5 percent to 112.5 percent (Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1991a [NUREG/CR-4911]).
Typically, the schedule of an effective incentive contract has the shape given in figure 1 in Appendix C (Merchant 1989) . This creates a motivational range for performance that spans from point a to point b.
6 That is, the agent receives increasing rewards for increasing levels of performance. Nuclear incentive programs, on the other hand, incorporate dead bands 7 (see figure 2 in Appendix C). In this case the motivational range spans two segments of performance: from point a' to point b' and from point c' to point d'. Consequently, there is less incentive for units that are performing squarely in the middle of the dead band, for example at point y. For these units the motivational effect of the incentive contract is less than for a unit that is either close to the ends of the dead band (i.e., points b' or c') or inside the motivational range. 8 It is assumed that these incentive programs indirectly affect plant management. For example, financial incentives are expected to impact the top management of utilities, who in turn are expected to take appropriate steps to motivate plant management to improve efficiency.
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Considerable debate has taken place over the effects of incentive programs on nuclear performance (see Hanson et al. 1989 and NRC 1991) . Though the financial consequences featured in these programs are meant to motivate managers 8 to meet or exceed performance standards, in practice many observers consider them too small to have any significant impact. According to our theory about reward composition, if the reward is not valued or if it is insufficient, it is not likely to have its intended effect. An opposing point of view is that even small penalties are viewed by the utility as undesirable because rate payers and stockholders may view penalties as an indication of deficient management (see NRC 1991a). As we noted earlier, the problem of how such firm-level consequences are supposed to translate into actions by individual managers is not addressed.
Finally, while the stated primary objective of incentive programs is to promote efficiency, regulatory bodies such as the NRC have been concerned with the potential for harm (see NRC 1991b) . This creates a competing incentive relation that can deflect the original intent of an incentive program. Because these incentive programs can influence the financial status of a utility, the NRC has voiced concerns that such programs could influence operating decisions to the detriment of nuclear safety (see NRC 1991b). For example, in the interests of real or perceived shortterm economies, a utility may delay necessary repairs, maintenance, and upgrades, or reduce the length of required outages to meet an incentive criterion. Such decisions ultimately may compromise the safety of operations.
METHODS
Our earlier analysis of incentive systems success suggests a number of reasons the PUC use of incentives should meet with difficulty.
• The incentive systems appeal to the self-interest of the utility, not the direct interests of the individual manager. Thus the close link between rewards and performance, at least with regard to the utility's managers, does not exist. Incentives do not necessarily deliver rewards valued by managers, and whatever rewards are sent are delivered through multilayered and uncertain channels.
• The incentives themselves may not be large enough to induce the desired behavior.
• The incentives are scheduled and targeted so broadly that dead zones create insensitive responses and remove their effectiveness.
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• The incentives are tied to productivity, but a competing incentive relation exists, which is directed toward safety. Thus we have more than a simple dyadic relation, and the productivity incentives compete with another priority.
In order to examine the effects actually produced by incentive programs in the nuclear industry, we specify efficiency and safety models and test them using data on the industry and nuclear regulation. We will describe these efficiency and safety models, the dependent and independent variables and controls, and the data sources for the analyses.
The Efficiency Model
Efficiency is defined as the residual output after accounting for all the factors of production. This is modeled with a linear regression in which a series of terms representing controls and independent variables such as conditions of energy production in the plant are assumed to affect the dependent variable, the capacity factor, and the measure of effciency.
9 The factors on the right side of the equation include a number that have been shown to affect a plant's efficiency. These factors can include the age of the plant, the technology of the plant (boiling or pressurized water reactors), the level of capital investment, and the plant's cost experience. The factors also include, of course, a variable that represents the presence or absence of incentive programs, which is the focus of this article.
*We also tested log-linear forms of the same model and found that the essential results were robust to the different specifications of the production function.
The basic version of the efficiency model is:
CF it denotes the capacity factor of nuclear plant i at time t, X k are the various factors of production, and INC is a dummy variable that denotes the presence of incentive programs. The coefficients j3 measure the relative effect of various explanatory variables on the level of efficiency. A significant positive coefficient for the incentive variable indicates that its presence is positively correlated with the capacity factor and hence with the efficiency of nuclear power generation. While some previous researchers (see Komanoff 1976; Lester and McCabe 1991) have used a multiplicative log-linear production function to model efficiency, we use a linear function similar to the one used by Hewett (1989) . The linear functional form allows us to separately study the effect of incentive programs on the level, and on changes in the level, of efficiency.
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The equation for estimating the effects of incentive programs on the changes in the level of efficiency over a time period A is: The coefficients 0' measure the relative effect of various explanatory variables on the percentage change in the level of efficiency.
The Safety Model
The safety model uses four indicators of safety reported by the NRC. They are safety system failures (SSF); safety system actuations (SSA); scrams (SCRAMS); and significant events (SE). A more detailed description of these variables is given in Appendix B. The Poisson probability distribution specifies the incidence of these indicators. It captures the infrequent and discrete nature of such incidents and has been applied extensively as a model of accident probabilities. 10 If one assumes that each reactor has some probability of being involved in a safety-related incident, the expected number of safety-related incidents for unit i in year t, r^, can be modeled as a function of the incident rate per year \ t , and the number of years under study, D it . The accident rate is parametized as an exponential function of a nuclear unit's operating characteristics, which insures that the estimated incident rates are nonnegative (see Rose 1990) . If exogenous variables are denoted by the vector X it , the safety accident rate is given by \ = exp and the expected number of incidents is = D it exp (X it /3).
If safety incidents are distributed as Poisson random variables with a conditional mean given by equation 3, the parameters of the model can be efficiently and consistently estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function.
The research design used in the study compares the performance of plants that had incentive programs with plants that did not have such programs during 1989 and 1990 ." We control for previous plant performance level by explicitly incorporating lagged performance as an explanatory variable. A plant must have been under the incentive program for at least two years to The NRC monitors other indicators along with the four used in this study. However, the indicators used here are those most used by the industry as well as by researchers.
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ensure that the program had been in place long enough to have an influence.
Dependent Variables
As we noted earlier, the annual capacity factor (CF) is an efficiency measure used to assess the performance of power plant operations. It is defined as the energy actually generated by the plant, divided by the total amount of energy that the plant would have generated had it operated at its design power rating continuously throughout the year. Even though in the United States virtually all plants are operated in the baseload mode, the maximum capacity factor for plants is less than 100 percent because reactors must be shut down some months for refueling. Such outages are planned many months in advance. During the refueling outage a fraction of the core, typically one-fourth or one-third, is replaced with fresh fuel. Maintenance work that cannot be done while the plant is in service is also done then. Apart from these scheduled outages, forced outages also may occur as a result of operator error, equipment malfunction or degradation, or violation of the safety specifications. So the capacity factor (as an indicator of plant performance) depends on how well the plant has been designed, built, operated, and maintained.
In the second version of the model we also include the four safety performance indicators, SSFs, SSAs, SCRAMs, and SSEs as dependent variables. These indicators are routinely monitored by the NRC to assess the safety performance of nuclear plant operations.
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Independent Variables and Controls
The independent variables and controls that constitute the factors on the right side of the models in equations 1 and 2 above include several characteristics of the plant or the regulatory program as well as several factors of production in the plant, such as capitalization and cost experience.
We model the presence of incentive programs using a dummy variable, INC (yes = 1, no = 0). The coefficient for this variable measures the effect of incentive programs on the efficiency of nuclear power generation. In addition, we use the following technical and organizational factors as control variables in the study.
Earlier studies have indicated that the age of the power plant is an important variable, because experience gained from plant operations may result in a clearer understanding of design-"This ratio is computed by dividing the total cost of land, plant structures and improvements, and equipment by the name plate capacity of the plant. l4 Total production expenses include annual expenses for supervision and engineering; fuel, coolant and water; steam; electric; rents; and maintenance of structures, reactor plant, and electric plant. performance relationships, leading in turn to design improvements and better operating and maintenance practices (see Joskow and Rozanski 1979) . After some point in the life of the plant, however, the opportunities for further learning are fewer, and there may be a gradual decline in performance if the marginal cost of maintaining high levels of capacity utilization is too expensive. While the nominal design lifetime of the nuclear power plants is thirty years, some deterioration can be expected well before this (Lester and McCabe 1991) . In this study the variable AGE measures the number of years the plant has been on line.
We differentiate between the two kinds of production technologies for nuclear power production. It is likely that the manner in which power is produced, or boiling water (BWR), or pressurized water (PWR) would affect the relationship between performance and its factors of production. We use a dummy variable, BPH (BWR = 1, PWR = 0), to denote the use of a particular technology. In addition it is likely that the presence of more than one unit on the same site would lead to better performance due to economies of scale and intersite learning (Lester and McCabe 1991) . A dummy variable, DUPL (multiple units = 1, single unit = 0), is used to describe the presence of more than one unit at the same site.
Unlike unregulated firms, electric utilities are operated to supply all the electric power that is demanded at a price that is established by the appropriate regulatory commission. Most of the capital costs are incurred at the time the power plant is constructed. Nuclear power plants are designed to meet baseload demand (i.e., level of demand that does not vary), and thus they are expected to operate continuously. However, by its choice of inputs and resource allocations (e.g., level of spending on maintenance versus capital additions) a plant can affect its output and hence its efficiency (see Hewett 1989) .
In this study, performance (i.e., efficiency as measured by the capacity factor) is a function of its various factors of production. We use the level of capitalization of the plant 13 per unit installed capacity, CAP, as a measure of the capital stock for the plant, and we use total production expenses per megawatt, PR, as a measure of the variable costs for the plant.
14 In other words, the level of capital investment in the plant as well as the level of costs expended in producing the plant's energy output affect the observed level of efficiency (as measured by capacity factor) with which the plant operates.
In estimating a second version of the model, we incorporate safety variables because a plant's input choices are also functions of required levels of plant safety. For example, poor safety performance in the past may require increased resource allocation in the current period to meet mandated safety standards.
Finally, we include lagged efficiency and safety variables in the efficiency and safety models, respectively, in order to model prior performance history. In addition, we also incorporate a lagged production expense variable (lagged cost/MWHr) to capture levels of past production expenses that might help explain current performance.
Data Sources
The data for this study come from three main sources: the Department of Energy utility data base on the financial performance of the electric utilities for [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] ; the NRC data base on the safety performance of electric utilities for the [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] period; and the NRC report on Incentive Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants by State Regulators (NRC 1991a).
We segmented the utility and NRC data bases into two-year periods and used averages over each two-year period, 1987-1988 and 1989-1990 , to compute variable values. We did this to capture enough safety incidents, which ordinarily occur with a very low probability.
Use of incentive regulation by PUCs is a relatively recent phenomenon. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, trade journals and NRC publications (1991b and c) began discussion of the potential implications from this new form of regulation. In this study we use the period [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] to capture the effects of this phenomenon, since this period is the earliest it is feasible to do measurements (i.e., allowing at least two years after the regulation is imposed for the effects to materialize).
We limit our analysis to these four years because we have found that over time the PUCs have been tinkering with and updating their rules for incentive regulation. Therefore, we felt that a longer time might span too many changes, which would allow additional noise to be incorporated in the observed relationships. In addition, the NRC and the Department of Energy sometimes change the definitions of the safety and efficiency variables, which can compromise the integrity of the data over long periods. For the years [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , we checked carefully to ensure that the definitions of all the variables used in this study did not change.
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The data constitute a unique source on the issues in question. Although the data have a number of limitations, it is important that scholars attempt to evaluate the performance of the new incentive programs for the purpose of determining whether these latest experiments in administrative regulatory design promote efficiency, and thus are worth expanding, and whether there may be any effects on the critical issue of safety in the nuclear industry.
RESULTS
Effects on Efficiency
The results regarding the effect of incentive programs on the efficiency of nuclear power generation are presented in exhibit 1. We test two versions of equation (1). The first version includes only structural variables such as age, production technology, and resources used by the plant, and the second version also includes measures of safety performance. Column 1 gives the effects of incentive programs on plant efficiency after controlling for the age, production technology, presence of multiple units at the site, factors of production such as capital costs and operating production costs, and lagged capacity factor and production costs (to control for past efficiency performance and production expenditures, respectively). As can be seen, the coefficient for the variable indicating presence of an incentive program, INC, is negative (-8.474 ) and, with a t-value of -2.27, highly significant. This indicates that the presence of incentive programs is correlated with a poorer than average level of efficiency performance. In addition, the significant and positive coefficients for the lagged capacity factor, CF878, and production expenses, COST/ MWHr878, indicate that plants that were more efficient and that spent more in the past are more efficient now.
Column 2 gives the results when lagged indicators of safety performances are also included as explanatory variables. 15 The "This format is similar to the format used coefficient for the INC variable is -5.296 and continues to be Before incorporating all the safety van-1 ulte significant, with a t-value of -1.62. The variables for the abies in the model we examined them for lagged capacity factor (labelled CF878) and production expenses muiticoiiinearity and did not find it to be (COST/MWHr878) also continue to be significant. In addition, significant, in addition, we estimated the ±e j aed variable mat measures the average number of signifiequation using a linear combination of ,_," ___. . . a-• t.-t-• Jthe safety indicators used by some of the cant events ( SE 878 > has a negative coefficient, which indicates activist groups that follow the safety per-that more significant events in the past may be correlated with formance of the nuclear power industry, poorer efficiency performance in the current period, although the positive across those results is that for scrams. The others are mostly negative. The significant negative relationship between the presence of incentive programs and the level of efficiency is plausible because incentive programs were most probably imposed on units that were poor performers to begin with. Anecdotally, poor performance appears to have been one of the motivations for many PUCs to implement incentive programs. We next tested to
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Making Incentive Systems Work determine whether the performance of units with incentive programs was improving faster than the units without such programs. These results are presented in exhibit 2. Column 1 gives the effect of incentive programs on the percentage change in capacity factor. The negative and significant coefficient for the INC variable (-0.168 with a t-value of -2.09) indicates that, on average, plants with incentive programs show a lower rate of improvement than do plants without incentive programs. Also, the significant negative coefficient for the current production expenditures (PR890) and the significant and positive coefficient for the lagged production expenditures (COST/MWHr878) seem
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to indicate that although spending does not help to improve efficiency in the current period, it is effective two years after the spending occurs. These results seem to indicate that it takes time before higher spending on production can translate into improved performance.
Finally, the positive and weakly significant coefficient for the number of scrams (SCRAM878), the most extreme safety failure because it involves emergency reactor shutdown, suggests that improvement in efficiency could have been obtained at the cost of more scrams. Recall that the result for scrams is positive across the results we report. The other safety factors tend to be associated with decreases in efficiency. Was efficiency enhanced by pushing the nuclear units, so that more reactor shutdowns occurred? Were the worst-performing utilities (those that had the highest number of serious incidents like scrams) able to show the best efficiency results because they were the most poorly run, in matters of both efficiency and safety, to begin with? We can speculate on this possibility, even if the data are only suggestive. It is possible that the relatively simple incentive relations inherent in the regulation fail to take account of complexities in the social system in which they operate, with resultant unanticipated and sometimes undesirable consequences.
Together these results present fairly strong evidence that incentive programs do not directly improve the efficiency performance of nuclear power generation. While many of the plants under incentive regulation apparently were poor performers to begin with, our results seem to indicate that thus far the presence of these programs does not appear to have led to tangible, immediate improvements in efficiency.
Does simplicity help?
One reason for the apparent lack of improvement could be that some incentive programs are not focused enough. In general, they are based on many measures of performance besides efficiency (capacity), such as fuel costs and safety indicators. Our theory suggests that incentive systems are likely to be more successful when they are simple and direct. The effectiveness of an incentive system can be compromised if confusing, conflicting, and difficult-to-implement signals are given by complex performance criteria.
To control for this we identified units subject to a single performance criterion, the capacity factor, and used the dummy variable INCNUC to denote the presence of these more focused incentive programs. The results using this variable are presented in exhibit 3. The results in columns 1 and 2 give the effect of incentive programs on the level of production efficiency and
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Making Incentive Systems Work percent changes in the level of production efficiency, respectively. As can be seen, while the INC variable still has significant negative coefficients in each of the estimations, the INCNUC variable has a positive sign and is also significant (a p-value of 0.05 to 0.1 for the effect on efficiency [column 1], and a p-value "We found that it was difficult to measure the motivational value of an incentive program by plotting current performance of the plant on an incentive program graph similar to those in Appendix A and physically measuring its distance from the edges of the dead band.
of 0.1 to 0.15 for the effect on improvements in efficiency [column 2]). This seems to indicate that a focused program is more effective in achieving improvements in efficiency than is a diffuse incentive program based on many performance measures.
Do specific and tightly linked reward schedules help?
Another reason for the observed lack of improvement could be that some of the incentive programs are based on goals that are not specific enough, targets that are inappropriate for producing the desired effects, and reward schedules with reward contingencies that are not tightly linked to performances (e.g., Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983; Locke and Latham 1990) . While it is difficult to measure directly the relative motivational effectiveness of various incentive programs, in this study we try to capture the motivational aspects of nuclear incentive programs by identifying units that either earned rewards or incurred penalties during the period they were under incentive regulation. 16 We hypothesize that these units had a higher motivation to improve than units that never had been rewarded or penalized. These latter units are assumed to have been consistently in the dead-band range. We use the dummy variable INCEFF to denote a more motivational incentive program (i.e., firms actually have received some rewards or penalties). The results using this variable are presented in column 1 of exhibit 4. As can be seen, while the INC variable (identifying firms that operate under incentive programs) continues to have a significant negative coefficient, the coefficient for INCEFF, though positive, is not significant.
We repeated the estimations incorporating the variable INCEFF in order to study the effects of incentive programs on changes in capacity factor. These results are presented in column 2 of exhibit 4. As can be seen, the coefficient for INCEFF is again positive but not significant. The receipt of rewards or penalties in the past does not seem to have enough of a motivational value to significantly improve current performance.
To summarize, the results for the effects of incentive programs on the efficiency of nuclear power generation present fairly strong evidence that incentive programs do not directly improve that efficiency. In addition, there is some evidence that more-focused incentive programs using a single performance measure such as capacity factor are more successful in promoting improvements. Finally, our results do not show that the receipt of rewards or penalties is correlated with subsequent improvements in performance. Perhaps the amount of the financial rewards or the number of punishments are indeed too small to be of consequence. 
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Effects on Safety
The safety performance of nuclear plants was tested using a system actuations (SSAs). These results indicate that while the presence of incentive programs is associated with poorer safety performance, as indicated by the number of safety system actuations (SSA890) experienced by the units, other safety indicators are not affected. Other significant variables that might explain the occurrence of safety system failures (SSF890) seem to be the age of the plant, its production technology, and the level of capitalization (CAP890). The results for number of significant events (SE890) and the number of scrams (SCRAM890) are not significant. On the whole, the model for safety performance shows generally weak results, which could be due to a poor fit of the estimated model. Differences also appear in results for the safety indicators. This might be an indication that there is perhaps considerable dissimilarity in the causes leading to different kinds of safety events; hence, use of the same model to estimate each may not be appropriate. It is difficult to infer much from these results because while the NRC diligently tracks each of these safety indicators, previous research has failed to determine if some are more important than others and thereby deserve closer scrutiny.
Finally, we use the nonparametric x 2 test to evaluate the effect of incentive programs on changes in safety performance.
17
Here we were concerned primarily with whether the safety performance of nuclear plants improved or deteriorated when they participated in incentive programs. These results are presented in exhibit 6. We see that the only significant results are for the incentive variable that signifies the presence of more-focused incentive programs, INCNUC. While the effects of focused programs on changes in all safety indicators are significant, the direction of the effect differs among the various safety indicators: The effect of focused incentive programs on changes in safety system failures (CHGSSF) and the number of significant events (CHGSE) is an improvement (positive effect), but the effect on safety system actuations (CHGSSA) and number of scrams (CHGSCRAMS) shows a deterioration in safety (negative effect). The CHGSCRAMS result, showing a correlation between the presence of a focused incentive program and an increase in the number of scrams experienced by the unit, supports earlier observations that increases in efficiency might have been obtained by overly pushing the unit. The speculation is that plant managers, given a more specific incentive focus to work toward, operate the plant in such a way as to make it more susceptible to scrams.
To summarize, the results for safety performance do not provide strong support for the hypothesis that the presence of incentive programs could be detrimental to all kinds of safety performance. The presence of more-focused incentive programs, however, seems to result in a higher number of reactor shutdowns, which could indicate an overextension of the unit. Ironically, incentive systems that may be more likely to enhance efficiency (i.e., focused incentive designs) may in at least some contexts adversely affect safety. In addition, the presence of l7 we decided not to use the Poisson incentive programs has been found to be associated with safety regression to estimate changes in safety system actuations. Earlier we saw that scrams may be associated indicators because, while a linear function with hi her efficiency . The results for the different safety inconsistent results, additional work with longitudinal data is needed in order to test more thoroughly the relationship between safety and incentive programs.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study's results regarding the effects of incentive programs on the efficiency of nuclear plants do not support the argument that they improve efficiency. The results do not suggest that the receipt of rewards or penalties is associated with subsequent improvement in performance; the link between reward and performance does not appear to be strong enough. The rewards themselves may not be large enough. Finally, the existence of another important social priority, safety, may be blunting the incentives' effects. While evidence supports the argument that more-focused programs using a single performance measure are successful, many existing programs employ more than one performance criterion. The industry, however, has been spending more on production, which over time seems to improve performance anyway. Unfortunately, the presence of more-focused incentive programs seems to yield more reactor shutdowns. Ironically, incentive systems that may be more likely to enhance efficiency (i.e., focused incentive programs) may adversely affect safety.
We would conclude that the incentives in their present form have not been successful in providing enough motivation to 425/J-PART, July 1999 improve efficiency, and, though the evidence is weaker, incentive programs appear to be either neutral or marginally detrimental to the safety of nuclear power operations. Given the limited data available, our conclusions and the recommendations that follow from them must be considered tentative. Because of their novelty, incentive programs have been designed and implemented largely on the basis of ad hoc theoretical arguments. It is time to convert that guidance to more-systematic theory, grounded in the emerging empirical experience of the industry.
Consider now how the experience of incentive programs in nuclear power generation is consistent with the theory of incentive system success that we presented earlier:
Incentive sending: It is clear that the outcomes desired by program designers are complex, not simple and well defined. They may even be contradictory to the extent that efficiency may conflict with safety in at least some respects. We have no evidence that incentive program designers had clearly resolved the potential conflict between efficiency and safety. Thus, incentive programs must not only be focused; they must be focused in such a way as to most effectively obtain the full range of outcomes desired, including both efficiency and safety concerns.
Sender-receiver relation:
Incentive programs assume that rewards or penalties that relate to the firm's interests are somehow converted into rewards valued by the managers who must respond to or implement these programs. We really do not know if such a conversion process occurs so that the rewards actually received by managers are valued and supplied in sufficient quantities. The rewards or penalties are relatively modest and thus may be supplied at too low a level, even when a firm's behavior triggers their receipt. Moreover, the existence of broad dead bands in the incentive schedule means that the rewards, being nonexistent across that broad range, are ineffective and cannot receive adequate valuation by the firm as the receiver. They are clearly offered with a schedule that is not effective in inducing appropriate responses.
Incentive transmission also may be faulty. Incentive programs that are designed to apply to firms must be interpreted to individual managers to insure that they perceive the benefits to the firm of compliance and the rewards that ensue. We need to do empirical work on the ways that managers learn of regulatory programs and how they perceive and act with regard to these programs.
Incentive channeling is at best indirect. The targets specified in incentive programs are relatively nonchallenging and may not be effective. Furthermore, our data, though inconsistent, suggest that the current design of targets could lead to unsafe conditions in some instances. We need to develop better measures and keep better data on behavior and outcome in both efficiency and safety, so that the effects of incentive programs can be tracked more reliably.
Incentive receiving: Again, we need to better understand how utility managers perceive the incentive program, understand the reward contingencies, and implement compliance. We need to better understand why certain safety failures seem to occur more often than others under incentive programs.
Incentive system etnbeddedness: We need to understand how socially mediated norms and cultural artifacts affect the reward and reward response process for managers. Regulatory incentive programs may not be linked to the normative processes that guide the behavior of industry professionals. In effect, we could have two incommensurate systems of control and reward: one mediated from outside by the regulatory system and one linked to externally supported norms of professional judgment. When professionals are trained to optimize efficiency so that increased resources are automatically directed to such ends, safety ends will finish second (on behavior in occupational communities, see Van Maanen and Barley 1984) . That efficiency and safety can be integrated is apparent from LaPorte and Thomas (1995), but we do not understand how best to design, transfer, and implement such systems. The inconsistent results we observed with regard to safety may simply reflect the lack of integrated design for promotion of safety. As a result, safety measures can be affected in inconsistent ways by application of interventions, like an incentive program not targeted for such integration.
Implications
The design of performance-based incentive programs is of interest to all the actors: the utilities, the PUCs, and the NRC. The PUCs would like a contract that is truly motivational in achieving the desired results. To this end, incentive contracts should have slopes that are steep, dead bands that are small, targets that are high enough to be challenging, and rewards and punishments that are big enough to be meaningful. From the NRC's perspective, however, the incentive contract should have just the opposite design features. The NRC has recommended that incentive programs should be designed to feature broader dead bands, flatter slopes, and insignificant rewards and punishments (see NRC 1991b). Essentially, the NRC supports incentive programs with low motivational value because of a belief that this is necessary to ensure that managers do not focus too much on efficiency that could be detrimental to safety.
As a result of these discrepancies between the objectives of the stakeholders, the existing incentive programs do not appear to have enough built-in motivation. For example, the wide dead bands in these programs seem to be designed to penalize poor performance and to reward only extraordinary achievement. Also, many of the incentive contracts are designed so that the performance of the plant is already within a broad dead-band range, or the dead band is set so that the current performance of the plant is just above the threshold, thus providing little motivation for improvement.
In addition, the lack of improvement also may indicate that the incentives for the utilities have not been effectively transferred to plant management via specific performance plans that are based on improvements in capacity factor. Perhaps an extension of the study could use some questionnaire-based data to address this issue. Finally, the paucity of the rewards and penalties as compared to other expenses for the units could further lessen incentives for improvement.
The results from this study provide some evidence about the difficulty of designing effective motivational contracts when there is more than one principal, each with a different objective. Perhaps what is needed for the nuclear power industry is a multidimensional incentive contract that would explicitly recognize these dual objectives and simultaneously provide motivation to improve both (cf. Goldberg 1976) .
Also, given the results of this study, perhaps the incentive programs should be redesigned to be more motivational so that their benefits will exceed the costs of enforcing this new form of regulation. In addition, given the weak but negative correlation between incentive programs and some indicators of safety performance, it would be prudent to continue to monitor the future impacts of such incentive regulation on the safety of nuclear operations.
Perhaps the most important suggestion we can offer as a consequence of the analysis in this article is that incentive programs must be designed with systematic and integrated attention to the full range of factors that may be associated with producing success via such systems. The firm is not like a big iron pump with a single-handed lever on top; you can't pump a 1. "The Target Capacity Factor Incentive program is applied to Southern California Edison (SCE) and San Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E). Designed to be a risk sharing mechanism for the utility and the rate payer, the program also serves to encourage efficient utility managements. Performance in terms of capacity factor is measured over the units' fuel cycle (approximately 18 months). The established deadband for SONGS 1 is from 55% to 75%; for SONGS 2 and 3, the deadband ranges from 55% to 80%. At capacity factors above the deadband, the utility rewards are equal to 50% of the fuel cost savings, and at capacity factors below 55%, the utility incurs a penalty equal to 50% of the replacement fuel costs" (p. 2-8).
2. "In June 1980, the Arkansas Public Service Commission established a nuclear performance incentive program to partially insulate ratepayers from replacement fuel costs that would result from unplanned outages of Arkansas Nuclear units 1 and 2. The program was modified in 1983 ... The 1983 revisions provide for penalties if a nuclear unit falls below the target capacity factor (+/-2.5%). Rewards equal to the fuel cost savings are accrued when a nuclear unit exceeds the target capacity factor" (p. 2-3).
3. "New Jersey's original and revised performance standards and revenue adjustments summarize the program in terms of the percentage of fuel costs the utility is permitted to recover from ratepayers. A cost recovery level of 130% is equivalent to a reward of 30% of the fuel cost savings. Similarly, a cost recovery level of 70% is equivalent to a penalty or disallowance of 30% of the replacement fuel costs. At capacity factor levels below 40% the NJBPU intervenes to review the circumstances associated with poor performance."
As is evident from the data below, New Jersey's revised program shifted the cost recovery levels so as to provide a greater incentive, but it still left a dead band. 
Original Program
